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Preface 
 
 
Centre for Monetary Economic (CME) at Norwegian School of Management BI has 
for the second time invited a group of economists to evaluate the Norwegian 
monetary regime and Norges Bank’s actual policy decisions and its communication of 
the policy. 
 
Our aim is to contribute to the general discussion on monetary policy, both within the 
political system, the academic community and among other interested parties. Last 
year the group suggested that the Bank’s actual interpretation of its stable exchange 
rate mandate should be formalised as a flexible inflation target regime.  In March, the 
Government introduced a formalised inflation target regime. This year, we do not 
have the ambitions to suggest another changeover of the system, but we hope to 
highlight important aspects of the present regime, and some areas that call for 
additional considerations. 
 
Even if the Norges Bank Watch group is invited by CME, neither the members of the 
working committee of CME nor any of CME’s members have taken part in 
discussions or preparation of this report, and they are therefore not responsible for it.  
Thus, the group is solely responsible for the report and the views presented here.  
 
 
Oslo, September 25 2001 
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1. Summary 
 
March 29 2001 the Norwegian government introduced a new regulation of monetary 
policy in Norway. The new regulation states that  
 
“Norges Bank’s implementation of monetary policy shall […] be oriented 
towards low and stable inflation. The operational target of monetary policy shall 
be annual consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5 per cent over time.” 
 
This is a formalisation of an inflation target for Norges Bank. 
 
In this report we will focus on the challenges of an inflation target. The first part of 
the report focuses on the possibilities and limitations in a flexible inflation targeting 
approach. The second part focuses on the implementation of an inflation target in 
Norway. 
 
Flexible inflation targeting 
In the first section of the report we present the main arguments in favour of flexible 
inflation targeting as the optimal monetary regime. Flexible inflation targeting 
concentrates on stabilising inflation. However, as there usually is a close connection 
between the level of economic activity and the inflationary pressures this should also 
contribute to output stabilisation. If aggregate demand is too high compared to actual 
production capacity, both wage pressures and margin increases will usually lead to 
higher inflation. If demand is too low, recessions and deflation are the usual outcome. 
When central banks try to influence domestic demand by adjusting its interest rates in 
order to stabilise future inflation, its aim is to achieve a good balance between 
aggregate demand and supply in the economy. This demand smoothing will naturally 
lead to a stabilising of the real economy and keeping unemployment at the lowest 
possible level without igniting inflation. International experiences with this policy 
have been reasonably good. 
 
However, economic imbalances might emerge without creating any consumer price 
inflation problems, at least in the short or medium term.  Major economic boom and 
bust periods have been driven by inflation and deflation in stock and property 
markets, usually closely connected to credit growth. In boom periods, demand gets a 
boost due to increased optimism about future rates of return. The supply side responds 
by increasing investments and thereby capacity. As both consumption and investment 
growth are partly financed by increasing net debt, the economy becomes unstable. As 
debt levels become high the economy gets more vulnerable to shocks. When the cycle 
turns both consumption and investments contracts. A boom turns into a bust.  
 
As expected prices are not affected, a flexible inflation target does not imply any 
response to such fluctuations in output. Therefore the central bank also needs to take 
other factors into regard in order to assure that it gets a complete picture of the 
economic developments. Central banks can, and should in our opinion, take asset 
prices and debt accumulation into consideration when they conduct their monetary 
policy.  
 
The “traditional” inflation targeting must be the main focus. However, the central 
bank should monitor debt developments and asset prices closely. Asset prices can and 
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should not be targeted, as it is always difficult to judge how asset price inflation is 
transmitted into the real economy. But central banks can and should “lean against the 
wind” when asset prices and credit growth deviate substantially from their normal 
paths. In such situations, asset price or debt market considerations might overrule the 
policy indicated by a pure inflation targeting analysis. Central banks should prepare 
themselves for handling such mixed signal situations, even if they probably are rare.  
 
 
Are the Norwegian institutions up to date? 
The new policy guidelines formalise a new role for Norges Bank, but the institutional 
framework, given in the Central Bank law, was not changed. Internationally, the 
central bank’s formal and real independence from other authorities and the need for 
economic competence in the decision-making bodies have been stressed as important 
success criteria for an inflation target regime. 
 
The current practice of monetary policy in Norway fulfils most of the criteria of a 
“best practice” inflation targeting bank. However, one should be aware that the 
Central Bank law was written with a fixed exchange rate regime in mind.  
Three issues are discussed in more detail: the right of instruction included in the law, 
the composition of the decision making Executive Board, and the desirability of 
publishing the minutes of Board meetings. Neither of these implies an immediate 
threat to the credibility of the current regime. However, to assure the long-term 
stability of an inflation target institutional changes need to be made. As a first step, 
the report suggests certain adjustments in appointing members to the Executive 
Board. Today, candidates are nominated by political parties. In the future, it is 
important that candidates to the Board have the qualifications to make the Board a 
demanding reference body for the Bank’s administration. A well-qualified and 
representative Board can assure that the public remains confident in the Bank’s 
analysis. 
 
The Norwegian inflation target at 2.5 per cent is relatively high. As a comparison the 
inflation target in Euroland is currently 2 per cent (as a maximum), and the inflation 
target in Sweden is 2 per cent. However, according to the monetary policy regulation 
the nominal exchange rate is still expected to be stable. The expected increase in 
domestic spending of oil revenues will most likely lead to a need for a real 
appreciation of the Norwegian krone in order to reduce the production, employment 
and profitability in the sectors exposed to foreign competition. Norges Bank Watch 
believes that Norges Bank’s assessment of the need for real appreciation would be of 
great interest. This assessment should include answering the question whether the 
current ½ per cent “automatic” real appreciation is appropriate given alternatives for 
fiscal policy,.  
 
 
Has the bank been successful in conducting its monetary policy? 
A central bank’s monetary policy within an inflation targeting regime can be 
evaluated by formulating three question. First, have the analysis of the economic 
development and inflation forecasts been reasonable, given the information available 
when the forecasts were made? Second, has the bank set its interest rates in 
accordance to the analysis? And third, has the bank reached its inflation targets?   
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Even if the formal inflation target was not implemented before March 2001, the 
bank’s interpretation of its mandate from early 1999 as an inflation target regime 
gives us the ability to evaluate Norges Bank according to these three questions.  
 
Norwegian interest rates have been very high compared to interest rates in most other 
countries. However, during this period the Norwegian economy has operated close to, 
and in some periods above, its long term production potential due to a high level of 
domestic demand. At the same time, the level of activity has stayed below potential 
output in parts of Euroland. According to Norges Bank’s assessment there has been 
no room for lower rates without increasing the risk for inflation. By and large, other 
observers of the Norwegian economy have shared this analysis, and Norges Bank 
Watch agrees. However, there is currently a substantial uncertainty tied to the  
international economic outlook. An international downturn should also affect 
Norway. We therefore do not believe that Norges Bank will allow the interest 
differential to increase much more. Nevertheless, a still tight labour market, and the 
outlook for a more expansionary fiscal policy should imply that short-term Norwegian 
interest rates will remain above other European rates for a long time. 
 
If domestic demand is boosted by increased spending of oil revenues there are 
arguments in favour of expecting Norwegian real interest rates to remain higher than 
abroad on a permanent basis. A tight monetary policy is a necessary ingredient in the 
structural transformation process. High interest rates dampen interest sensitive 
domestic demand. However, in such a scenario the exchange rate appreciation might 
come quite rapidly. If so, inflation pressure will be dampened.  
 
In the recent months we have seen an increasing interest rate differential for long-term 
government bonds.  This might reflect uncertainty about future Norwegian inflation. 
However, we find that there are several alternative (and in our view more credible) 
explanations; including the cost of hedging in the Norwegian market, and higher 
expected real interest rates in Norway. 
 
Communication 
The report concludes that Norges Bank has a firm and credible commitment to 
fulfilling the inflation target. The Bank enjoys a good communication with both the 
public and the financial markets. The Inflation Report, currently published three times 
a year, is a clear and well-written exposition of the Banks expectations and 
judgements and Norges Bank has demonstrated the ability to clarify its policy through 
articles and speech 
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2. Flexible inflation targeting  
 
2.1 Flexible inflation targeting: the emerging new consensus 
 
A new consensus has emerged about the optimal design of monetary policy. This new 
consensus can be summarised in four points (see box 1 for more detail).   
 
• The primary objective of the central bank is to maintain price stability. The 
central bank should not aim at permanently increasing economic growth or 
reducing unemployment. Such ambitions cannot be realised by the central bank. 
Instead if pursued, they will lead to accelerating inflation. Conversely by 
maintaining price stability the central bank does the best it can to maximise long 
run economic growth. The underlying reason is that economic growth (and 
employment) in the long run depends solely on real factors. 
• The objective of price stability applies to the medium run (say over a period of 
2 years). Thus when inflation exceeds the target, the central bank should be 
allowed to bring inflation back to target in a gradual manner. Such a gradual 
adjustment adds flexibility to inflation targeting giving room for the central bank 
to stabilise output. It has been shown by Svensson (1997) that flexible inflation 
targeting is broadly speaking the same as explicit output stabilisation. 
• With flexible inflation targeting there is no need for the central bank to 
pursue active stabilisation of output per se. Stabilising the rate of inflation 
around its target in a gradual manner has the happy effect of also stabilising output 
around its capacity level (see Alesina, et al. (2001) for a recent statement of this 
view). We note that the term gradual is important in this respect. 
• In a regime of flexible inflation targeting, the central bank should react to 
shocks (e.g. shocks in output, shocks in the exchange rate, etc.) only to the extent 
these shocks affect the rate of inflation.   
 
The new consensus about how monetary policies should be conducted goes further 
than the four points mentioned here. It extends to the political and institutional 
environment in which the central bank should operate. In this new consensus flexible 
inflation targeting can only be successful in the long run if three institutional 
conditions are met: 
1. The central bank should operate in an environment of political independence. 
Independence has two dimensions, instrument independence and goal 
independence. There is a general consensus that instrument independence is a 
necessary condition for a successful inflation targeting. It can be said to belong to 
best practice inflation targeting. That is, a central bank must be able to set its 
instrument for conducting its policies independently from political interference. 
There is less consensus about goal independence.  
2. The policy regime should be transparent. The publication of the inflation report 
is one element in this transparency. Transparency can be enhanced by the 
publication of the minutes of the meetings of the body that decides about the 
interest rate. It is still a matter of controversy whether or not such a publication 
improves the quality of policy making.  
3. Inflation targeting necessitates a framework allowing central banks to be 
made accountable for their policies. The way the accountability is organised 
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differs from one country to the other. It consists of two elements. The first one is 
to require that the President (Governor) of the central bank explains policies and 
possibly failures in these policies to the parliament or to the government. The 
second component consists in a sanctioning procedure when the Central Bank 
consistently fails to achieve the target for inflation. Few countries have an explicit 
sanctioning procedure.  
 
There is an interaction between flexible inflation targeting and political independence. 
Flexible inflation targeting is a simple policy rule that allows for an easy 
implementation. The ease of implementation has the effect that society has to worry 
less that the independence granted to the central bank will be misused. The simple 
rule makes it possible to control the performance of the central bank, and thus to make 
it accountable.  
 
Flexible inflation targeting is on its way to becoming the new conventional wisdom in 
monetary policy-making, not the least because it has turned out to be quite successful 
in many countries.1 Can we consider this to be a new and permanent improvement in 
the way monetary policy is conducted, or is flexible inflation targeting a passing fad, 
much like money stock targeting has been? We analyse this issue in the next sections. 
In order to do so we first study the central claim made by the proponents of flexible 
inflation targeting, i.e. that this strategy if properly applied keeps inflation low and 
contributes to output stabilisation.  
                                                 
1 For recent empirical evidence, see Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001). 
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Box 1- More on inflation targeting 
 
Best practice inflation targeting 
A new monetary policy regime has emerged that is slowly making its way as the new model 
for the conduct of monetary policy. This model has been called “flexible inflation targeting”. 
It has emerged as the result of new theoretical insights together with practical experimentation 
by an increasing number of central banks. We analyse the main ingredients of this model 
stressing those features that can be called “best practice”.  
The central feature of flexible inflation targeting can be described as follows (figure B.1 for a 
concise representation).  
1. The primary objective of the central bank is the maintenance of price stability. This 
leads to the formulation of a numerical target. There is a consensus that the numerical value 
of this target should be between 2 and 3 per cent. The best practice view is that there should 
be some symmetric error band around this numerical target, say 1per cent. This is what most 
central banks that apply inflation targeting do. Thus Norges Bank has set a target of 2.5 per 
cent with an error of + and - 1per cent. A major exception to this approach is the ECB, which 
has defined the target as a maximum inflation rate (2 per cent). The latter approach has been 
criticised for its asymmetric nature (see Svensson(1998)).  
2. It is desirable that the inflation targeting procedure should not react to movements in 
the price index that are temporary or the result of special factors. Therefore, many 
central banks use a concept of core inflation.  
3. The central bank makes a forecast of the future inflation over the medium run, 
typically 2 years. This forecast is based on a model of the economy and is made public. This 
usually takes the form of the publication of an inflation report, typically issued three or four 
times a year. The inflation report contains an analysis of the forces that determine future 
inflation. In addition, it presents the forecast of inflation together with an estimate of a 
confidence band. The latter allows the public to evaluate the uncertainty surrounding this 
forecast. In a way, it can be said that the inflation forecast plays the same role of the 
intermediate target in a money stock targeting strategy. 
4. The instrument used by the central bank is the short-term interest rate. The procedure 
to adjust the interest rate starts from a comparison of the inflation forecast with the inflation 
target. When the inflation forecast exceeds the target the central bank raises the interest rate; 
when it is below the target the central bank is supposed to lower the interest rate.  
5. A distinction has been made between strict and flexible inflation targeting. In the 
former the central bank has only one objective, i.e. inflation. In the latter the central bank also 
gives some weight to other objectives, typically the output gap or some measure of 
unemployment. It has been shown by Svensson(1997) that a strategy consisting in only 
targeting inflation but allowing for a gradual adjustment of the observed inflation towards its 
target is equivalent to a strategy in which the central bank explicitly targets the output gap. 
There is a growing consensus that such a flexible inflation targeting procedure constitutes best 
practice (see Alesina et al. (2001). Most central banks have not been very explicit about the 
length of time allowed for the gradual adjustment. There is some consensus that this can be 
anything between one and two years.  
 
 
cont. 
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Figure B.1 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
   Instrument    information used      objective 
     (intermediate target)           (numerical target) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
short-term interest rate  inflation forecast   inflation 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Inflation targeting as described in the previous section can only be successful in an 
institutional environment of political independence of the central bank. Independence has 
two dimensions, instrument independence and goal independence. There is a general 
consensus that instrument independence is a necessary condition for a successful inflation 
targeting. It can be said to belong to best practice inflation targeting. That is, a central bank 
must be able to set its instrument for conducting its policies independently from political 
interference. The practical implication of this instrument independence is that the minister of 
finance (or other representatives of the government) has no say in the decisions to change the 
interest rate. There is less consensus about goal independence. In some countries the 
government sets the numerical objective for inflation (the UK), so that the central bank has no 
goal independence. In other countries the numerical objective for inflation is decided by the 
central bank itself (Euroland). There is no consensus about which of the two regimes for 
setting the numerical objective is to be preferred.  
7. The success of inflation targeting also depends on the degree of transparency of the 
policy regime. The publication of the inflation report is one element in this transparency. 
Transparency can be enhanced by the publication of the minutes of the meetings of the body 
that decides about the interest rate. It is still a matter of controversy whether or not such a 
publication improves the quality of policy making, so that it would be premature to label such 
a publication best practice.  
8. Inflation targeting requires independent central banks. It also necessitates a framework 
allowing central banks to be made accountable for their policies. The way the accountability 
is organised differs from one country to the other. It consists of two elements. The first one is 
to require that the President (Governor) of the central bank appears before the parliament 
(ECB) to explain policies and possibly failures in these policies. In some countries the 
explaining is done differently in the form of a communication with the government (Bank of 
England). The second component consists in a sanctioning procedure when the Central Bank 
consistently fails to achieve the target for inflation. The Bank of New Zealand has gone the 
farthest in this, by making it possible to sack the President of the Bank. Most of the other 
countries do not have an explicit sanctioning procedure.  
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2.2 Flexible inflation targeting: The theory 
 
The central claim made by the theory of flexible inflation targeting is that this policy 
regime makes it possible for the central bank not only to stabilise the price level, but 
also to do the best possible job in stabilising output around its capacity (“natural”) 
level. The claim that flexible inflation targeting also stabilises output is quite obvious 
when shocks originate from the demand side. This is illustrated in figure 2.1, which 
represents the aggregate demand and supply curves in the inflation-output space3. It is 
assumed that there are positive and negative shocks in aggregate demand. This 
represented by the ADU and ADL curves. Capacity output (the “natural” output level), 
y*, is represented by a vertical line. The central bank cannot and does not try to 
influence this “natural” output level, which is determined by productivity growth, 
labour supply and the size of the real capital stock (i.e. y* is influenced by structural 
policies, but not by monetary policy).4  
 
-Flexible inflation targeting now implies that the central bank sets a target inflation 
rate, π*. In a boom (ADU ) the central bank raises the interest rate so as to lower the 
AD curve. In a recession it does the opposite. Because prices are sticky the central 
bank allows for a gradual adjustment of inflation and output.  It can immediately be 
seen that this strategy of stabilising inflation around π* also stabilises output around 
y*. In other words when the central bank follows a flexible inflation targeting strategy 
there is no need to explicitly target the output gap. This is good news because output 
gap statistics tend to be very unreliable (see Orphanides(2000)). 
 
Figure 2.1: Flexible inflation targeting and demand shocks 
 
          inflation 
     
 
            AS 
 
 
 
 
        π* 
 
         ADU 
 
 
 
                AD 
               ADL 
  
             y*    output 
                                                 
2 For recent empirical evidence, see Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001). 
3 The analysis can also be done in the price-output space with essentially the same results.   
4 As is well-known there is a large literature based on the Barro-Gordon model analysing time 
inconsistency problems that arise when central banks attempt to increase the natural output level 
(reduce the natural unemployment rate).   
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Does this analysis also carry over to supply shocks? The answer is positive. We show 
this in figure 2.2.  We assume that, due to a wage cost increase or an increase in 
energy prices, the supply curve shifts upwards from AS1 to AS2. We assume this to be 
a permanent shock so that capacity output is also lowered, from y*1 to y*2. After this 
supply shock, the short-term equilibrium position is in point A. Output exceeds 
capacity output (the output gap is positive) and inflationary pressure is generated. 
Because it targets inflation (at the level given by π*) the central bank reacts in the 
correct way, i.e. it raises the interest rate so as to gradually bring aggregate demand to 
the level consistent with a reduced level of capacity output. Put differently, inflation 
targeting is equivalent to stabilising output around its new “natural” level.  
 
We conclude that in the case of a permanent supply shock, focusing on the inflation 
rate is the correct policy. There is no trade-off for the central bank between stabilising 
output and stabilising inflation in the intermediate and long run. At least for a central 
bank that takes the view that it can do nothing to change the natural level of output (or 
the natural unemployment rate).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Flexible inflation targeting and supply shocks 
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A distinction should be made between permanent supply shocks (analysed in figure 2) 
and temporary supply shocks. The latter only involve shifts in the short-term 
aggregate supply curve. According to the proponents of inflation targeting the correct 
response of the central bank is to formulate its targeting strategy in terms of “core 
inflation” – as in the Norwegian case but not in the case of the ECB. This allows 
disregarding the effects of temporary supply shocks on inflation. The issue that 
remains here is whether the central bank is always able to distinguish between 
permanent and temporary supply shocks. In practice this may sometimes be difficult.  
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As a result, inflation targeting will not prevent central banks from making major 
policy errors. 
 
 
2.3.  Flexible inflation targeting: Some challenges to the consensus view 
 
The model underlying the emerging consensus in favour of flexible inflation targeting 
is simple and quite attractive. It has also become the standard macro-economic model 
used in classrooms and has gained a wide acceptability (see Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
(1999) for its use by neo-Keynesian economists). Its main feature is that demand and 
supply decisions are only influenced by present and expected goods prices and wages. 
This may be a serious shortcoming. In this section we show that if demand and supply 
decisions also depend on assets and on their valuation, volatility in output can be 
generated that does not show up in volatility of inflation, so that the close link 
between inflation variability and output gap variability breaks down.   
 
In order to analyse this problem we develop a scenario of boom and bust generated by 
movements in asset prices. We show the analysis in figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Inflation targeting in boom-and-bust scenario 
 
 
     π 
            boom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          bust 
 
       y*1      y*2  y 
 
 
Suppose a bubble arises in the stock market (or alternatively in the real estate market). 
This could be due to a perception that new technologies will lead to higher growth in 
the future (Japan in the 1980s, the US in the 1990s), but it can also be due to other 
factors (e.g. Scandinavian countries during the second half of the 1980s).  As a result 
of these positive expectations about future growth, consumers have an incentive to 
spend more. The only way they can do this is by increasing their debt position. 
Similarly firms, gripped by the same “animal spirits”, evaluate the future 
optimistically. This has the effect of raising the present value of future expected rates 
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of return on investment. As a result, investment activity increases, which raises 
capacity output. 
  
The effect of all this is to create a boom characterised by increases in aggregate 
demand and supply. We show this in figure 3. Thus, during the boom phase, the 
output gap is unaffected, and there are no inflationary pressures5.  The central bank, 
which follows an inflation targeting strategy, does not react. It has no reason to do so 
because its inflation forecasting exercise tells it that because of the simultaneous 
increase in demand and supply (productivity and/or excess capital formation) no 
inflation is to be expected in the future.  
 
After the boom comes the bust. The latter is typically produced by excessive debt 
accumulation of both consumers and firms. Debt deflation is set in motion and this 
results in a decline of aggregate demand. At the same time, however, producers find 
themselves with excess capacity, which leads them to disinvest. Capacity output 
declines.  
 
Like in the boom phase, during the bust phase the output gap is unaffected, and so is 
inflation. As a result, the inflation targeting central bank does not intervene. Yet there 
will be great volatility of output. We conclude that the one-to-one correspondence 
between inflation variability and output variability breaks down in a world where 
demand and supply decisions are influenced by assets and asset prices.  
 
Another way to formulate the problem is as follows. Demand and supply decisions are 
influenced not only by flow variables (goods prices and wages) but also by assets and 
their valuation. Both the wealth of the consumers and the present value of the 
investment projects depend on the expectations of future rates of return of capital. 
This leads to the possibility of self-fulfilling expectations. When agents are optimistic 
about the future they will forecast large rates of return. As a result, the value of assets 
increase, i.e. wealth of consumers increase because the stock prices reflecting these 
positive expectations increase. Similarly investors will calculate higher present values 
of the investment projects, so that the value of the firm increases. This then raises 
today’s demand for consumption, and it stimulates investment activity. The latter 
increases potential output. Thus demand and supply increase with little effect on 
inflation.   
 
It also follows that when the central bank targets the rate of inflation, this is consistent 
with infinitely many paths for output of goods and services. Inflation targeting is 
insufficient to tie down a unique output path. The output paths will be determined by 
the path taken by asset values, which in turn are determined by expectations. In order 
to determine a unique output path the central bank must also tie down asset values. 
How can this be done? We analyse this question in the next section where we suggest 
that the Central Bank should present an explicit strategy for how it intents to deal with 
asset price inflation.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5 This should not be interpreted literally. The point is that an asset driven boom raises demand and 
supply, so that its effect on inflation is of second order.   
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2.5. A two-stage strategy for the central bank 
 
Because of cycles in asset valuations (notably in real estate prices in the Norwegian 
case), cycles in output are generated that do not lead to changes in inflation. 
Therefore, a central bank that gives some weight to output stabilisation cannot be 
content of just following a flexible inflation targeting strategy, which only reacts to 
those shocks that affect current and future inflation. It must also have an eye on other 
variables even if these variables do not affect current and future inflation. What are 
these variables?  
 
In order to answer this question it is important to realise that consumers and investors 
who react to increasing asset values can only increase their spending by borrowing, 
domestically or abroad. Thus the natural asset variable to be monitored by the central 
bank is total credit to the private sector. This leads to the formulation of a “two-stage“ 
strategy. This strategy can be described as follows:  
 
• The first and main stage is flexible inflation targeting which has been described 
earlier, and which is now used by an increasing number of central banks. It must 
remain in place. It is the pillar that has to be used in normal times.  
• The additional stage consists in monitoring credit aggregates. It requires the 
central bank to monitor a number of credit aggregates, and to intervene and 
possibly to overrule the signals given by the first stage. One would expect that this 
would not happen frequently. In normal times it will remain unused. At the same 
time one can say with certainty (and with reference to the experience from the 
U.S. lately) that central banks will at some point in the future be confronted with 
the need to use the second stage. Note that the money stock can also have a useful 
role in this context.   
 
Several readers will note that the ECB has formulated a two-pillar strategy with 
similarities to our two-stage strategy. Ours, however, is quite different in nature. In 
contrast to the ECB strategy, ours gives a privileged role to inflation targeting (first 
stage) and complements it with a second stage that aims at checking unsustainable 
developments in the value of financial stocks (credit aggregates, money stock).  
 
Several points should be stressed about this strategy. First, in addition to credit 
aggregates, useful information for the implementation of the second stage can be 
obtained from asset prices (e.g. real estate prices and stock prices). This has been 
recommended by a number of influential economists recently (see Goodhart(2000), 
Checchetti, et al. (2000)). Second, the practical implementation of the two-stages 
must be quite different. Inflation targeting can be implemented in a very precise way, 
i.e. by specifying a precise numerical target and by monitoring how close inflation has 
stayed to this target. No such precision is possible when monitoring assets and asset 
prices. More judgement is necessary. This lack of precision is due to our lack of 
knowledge of how asset inflation is transmitted to the real economy. It is also hard, 
ex-ante, to assess whether given asset price levels are sustainable or not. The lack of 
precision also calls for using “leaning against the wind” rules when monitoring assets 
and asset prices, rather than targeting particular numbers.  
 
We conclude that central banks will have to use a two-stage strategy, i.e. a strategy 
consisting of flexible inflation targeting complemented by a strategy aimed at tying 
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down asset values. Failure to do so, will sooner or later confront the central banks 
with the problem of large disturbances in output that they did not see arriving on their 
“inflation targeting radar screens”.  
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3. Norges Bank and the conduct of monetary policy in 
Norway 
 
When the regulation of monetary policy was changed earlier this year the institutional 
framework of Norges Bank was not adjusted. We will give a short description of how 
the Norwegian system works, and then discuss whether this system needs to be 
attuned in light of the recent changes in monetary policy. 
 
3.1 The institutional framework of Norges Bank 
 
The law governing central banking in Norway was issued in 1985. Section 2 describes 
the relationship between the bank and the government. 
 
• “The Bank shall conduct its operations in accordance with the economic policy 
guidelines drawn up by the government authorities and with the country's 
international commitments.  
• Before the Bank makes any decision of special importance, the matter shall be 
submitted to the ministry.  
• The Council of State may adopt resolutions regarding the operations of the Bank. 
Such resolutions may take the form of general rules or instructions in individual 
cases. The Bank shall be given the opportunity to state its opinion before such 
resolutions are passed. The Storting shall be notified of resolutions as soon as 
possible. […]”6 
 
The obligation for the Bank to “conduct its operations in accordance with the 
economic policy guidelines drawn up by the government authorities” is in line with 
the rules governing e.g. Sveriges Riksbank. In countries with an inflation targeting 
regime the economic policy guidelines for the bank is a statement about a specific 
inflation target. We will return to the Norwegian economic policy guidelines below. 
 
The obligation to inform the government of important matters in advance is standard 
in inflation targeting regimes. The right of instruction can however be seen as a 
Norwegian “anomaly” when compared with current “best practice”.  
 
The right of instruction must be understood in terms of the fixed exchange rate regime 
at the time the Central Bank law was written, and a Norwegian tradition of a close 
contact between the Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank imposed by central bank 
governors after the Second World War.7 It is important to notice that the right of 
instruction comes with two check: the Storting must be informed as soon as possible, 
and Norges Bank is obliged to state its opinion on the matter.8 These checks are 
                                                 
6 All translations are from Norges Bank. 
7 This was partly a response to the “back to gold parity” policy followed by a very independent central 
bank policy in 1920’s and 30’s. 
8 Norges Bank’s obligations are made clear in section 3: 
•  “The Bank shall state its opinion on matters that are put before it by the Government or the 
ministry. 
• The Bank shall inform the ministry when, in the opinion of the Bank, there is a need for measures 
to be taken by others than the Bank in the field of monetary, credit or foreign exchange policy. 
• The Bank shall inform the public about the monetary, credit and foreign exchange situation.” 
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imposed to guarantee a public discussion if the right to instruct is used. There has 
been an argument of how this law was supposed to be applied (see Carsten Smith, 
1994, for a discussion). However, the understanding today seems to be that if the 
Government instructs Norges Bank to act in opposition to the best judgement of the 
Bank, the Governor of Norges Bank will leave office. It is therefore reasonable to see 
the right of instruction as nothing more than a formal statement of the government’s 
final say in all economic policy questions. The right of instruction has never been 
formally used.9 
 
Section 5 –7 discusses the organisation of the bank. Section 5: 
• “Supreme authority in the Bank is vested in an executive board and a supervisory 
council. 
• Under this Act, executive and advisory authority is vested in the Executive Board. 
The Board is in charge of the Bank's operations and manages its funds.  
• The Supervisory Council ensures that the rules governing the operations of the 
Bank are observed. […]” 
 
Section 6: 
• “The Executive Board consists of seven members, appointed by the government 
(formally the King) . The Governor and Deputy Governor shall be the chairman 
and deputy chairman of the Executive Board. They are appointed to full-time 
positions for terms of six years. Reappointment to the same position may take 
place for one period of a further six years. The other five members are appointed 
for four-year terms. Every other year, two - alternately three - members retire. 
These members may be re-appointed for a total period of twelve years. […]” 
 
Section 7: 
• “The Supervisory Council: The Supervisory Council consists of fifteen members 
elected by the Storting for four-year terms. Every other year, seven - alternately 
eight - members retire. From the members the Storting elects the chairman and 
deputy chairman for terms of two years. By re-election, members may serve for a 
total period of twelve years. […]” 
 
Like Norges Bank, Sveriges Riksbank has a Supervisory Council and an Executive 
Board. The Supervisory Council is as in Norway elected by Parliament. However in 
Sweden it is the Supervisory Council that names the Executive Board. In Norway the 
government names the Executive Board of Norges Bank. The political parties 
represented in the Storting nominate candidates for the Executive Board. The 
Government has only on rare occasions opposed these nominations. 
 
The law states the following about the official reports from Norges Bank to the 
government (section  28):  
• “The Executive Board shall each year prepare an annual report and accounts for 
the year. […] 
• The annual report and the audited annual accounts, as well as the statement of the 
Supervisory Council on the minutes of meetings of the Executive Board, are sent 
                                                 
9 Christiansen (2001) argues that the change from an exchange rate target to an inflation target was an 
instruction of Norges Bank. It is however more natural to see this as a change in the economic policy 
guidelines of the government than as an instruction. 
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to the ministry for submission to the government and communication to the 
Storting. A communication from the ministry to the Storting concerning activities 
in Norges Bank shall be made at least once during each Storting session, and more 
frequently if special circumstances dictate. […]” 
 
Norges Bank is supposed to file a yearly statement. In Sweden the Board is expected 
to present reports on monetary policy twice a year. Like e.g. Bank of England Norges 
Bank is responsible to report to the government, not to Parliament. However, the 
reports shall be made available to the Storting. The Storting shall also receive a report 
from the government on the work of the Bank. The government’s duty to inform the 
Storting is not limited to the yearly statements if special circumstances occur. 
 
According to section 6 the Executive Board is obliged to keep minutes from their 
meetings. These are at the time being not made available to the public. It has been 
seen as standard practice to publish board minutes in a number of inflation targeting 
regimes, including the UK and Sweden. 
 
3.2 The monetary policy guidelines 
 
The Norwegian government 29 March 2001 adopted a new regulation of monetary 
policy. Section 1 reads: 
• “Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s national 
and international value, contributing to stable expectations concerning exchange 
rate developments. At the same time, monetary policy shall underpin fiscal policy 
by contributing to stable developments in output and employment. 
• Norges Bank is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy. 
• Norges Bank’s implementation of monetary policy shall, in accordance with the 
first paragraph, be oriented towards low and stable inflation. The operational 
target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price inflation of 
approximately 2.5 per cent over time. 
• In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest 
rates, taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be 
taken into account.” 
 
In addition the Storting Report no. 29 of 2001 states: 
• “Consumer price inflation is expected to remain within an interval of +/-1 
percentage point around the target.” 
 
Through a number of speeches and articles the Norges Bank Governor, Svein 
Gjedrem, has made clear how Norges Bank will implement this new regulation. These 
comments should give a fairly good insight in how Norges Bank will proceed when 
conducting monetary policy.10 
 
• “If evidence suggests that inflation with unchanged interest rates will be higher 
than 2.5 per cent, the interest rates will be increased. If it appears that inflation 
with unchanged interest rates will be lower than 2.5 per cent, the interest rates will 
be reduced. There is symmetry here.” 
                                                 
10 All citations from Aftenposten, 29 May, 2001, except number 5 that is from Dagens Næringsliv, 6 
July, 2001. 
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• “Our analyses indicate that a substantial share of the effects of an interest rate 
change occurs within two years. Two years is thus a reasonable time horizon for 
achieving the inflation target of 2.5 per cent. This means that interest rates are set 
with a view to achieving an inflation rate of 2.5 per cent two years ahead.” 
• “In some situations where unexpected events lead to an inflation that is too high, it 
may be appropriate to apply a longer time horizon than two years. For example, 
reducing inflation to 2.5 per cent within this time horizon may be associated with 
unnecessary real economic costs. A precondition for applying a longer time 
horizon is that there is clear evidence of strong confidence in low and stable 
inflation over time on part of the economic agents.” 
• “Developments in financial and property markets can be a source of a more 
unstable inflation environment. In principle, it would be appropriate to use the 
interest rate to counter this. In practice, however, it is difficult to assess whether 
property and financial asset prices are sustainable.” 
• “[…] Norges Bank will normally proceed with caution in connection with any 
interest changes in response to fluctuations in the exchange rate. A special 
situation arises if strong turbulence in the foreign exchange market indicates that 
confidence in monetary policy is in jeopardy. A rapid and pronounced change in 
the interest rate may then be appropriate.” 
• “When Norges Bank concludes that a change in the key rate is appropriate, the 
change will in most cases be made gradually.” 
• “Norges Bank analyses the inflation prospects in its Inflation Report, which is 
published three times a year.” 
• “The Government has assigned a task to Norges Bank. Norges Bank uses its 
professional judgement in a delimited area. The results of our decisions can be 
measured. Hence the government authorities can evaluate our performance.” 
 
It should be noticed that the regulation of monetary policy in Norway probably puts 
more weight on the medium and long-term stability of the nominal exchange rate than 
what is usual in most inflation targeting regimes. One can also point out that the 
Norwegian inflation target of 2.5 per cent is slightly higher than in Canada, New 
Zealand, Sweden and the Euro area. It is however in line with the target in the United 
Kingdom and Australia. 
 
 
3.3 The Norwegian system compared with best practice 
 
There are three important differences between the Norwegian system and the “best 
practice” described in section 2. 
 
1. The Norwegian government has an explicit right to instruct Norges Bank. This 
might reduce the accountability of the Bank. 
2. Political parties nominate candidates to the Executive Board of Norges Bank. This 
can affect the political independence of the Bank. 
3. There is a special focus on nominal exchange rates in the economic policy 
statements made by the government. Further the Norwegian inflation target is 
somewhat higher than in many other inflation targeting regimes. 
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Do these “anomalies” have potentially negative effects for the stability and 
effectiveness of the Norwegian inflation-targeting regime? Do they come with a real 
economic cost? 
 
The right to instruct the bank 
As pointed out above the standard interpretation of this clause is that it is only to be 
used in the most extreme situations. One can argue that a legal opportunity to instruct 
the central bank makes the central bank more vulnerable for meddling than a regime 
where the independence of the central bank can only be threatened by changing the 
law. However, in practice no country would allow a central bank to act in opposition 
to the government over time, so some right of instruction will always exist. 
 
The current text might be interpreted as a division of responsibility for monetary 
policy between Norges Bank and the Government. The Government can not look 
back and criticise the stance of Norges Bank as wrong, since the Government, if it 
actually believed Norges Bank to be wrong, should have instructed the Bank to 
change course. A strength of the system is that the Government must commit to stand 
behind how monetary policy is conducted. But there are also problems. On one hand 
it might be easier for the Government to influence the positions of the Bank through 
informal channels using the right of instruction as “a threat”. On the other hand the 
Government might lose some of its force when evaluating the conduct of Norges 
Bank ex post. The right of instruction can become a liability for the government if it is 
supposed to hold Norges Bank accountable for monetary policy. 
 
There exist rights of instruction in other inflation targeting regimes. UK legislation 
provides that if, in extreme circumstances, the national interest demands it, the 
Government will have the power to give instructions to the Bank on interest rates for 
a limited period. The right can be exercised only through subordinate legislation 
approved by Parliament. However, the Norwegian right of instruction is more general. 
It might seem especially strange to keep the right to instruct the Executive Board in 
specific cases if the process of choosing members to the Board is changed, as we 
suggest below. That would imply that the Government does not trust its own experts. 
However, given the present non-use of this clause, a change would probably not make 
much of a difference for the actual independence of the Bank. 
 
The Executive Board 
In an inflation targeting regime the interest rate should be based on a sound 
understanding of how to reach the long-term goals of the central bank. Interest rate 
decisions must therefore be based on two important criteria:  
• competence in understanding the long-term impact of central bank instrument, and 
• independence from influence that is not in accordance with the goals of the bank.  
 
Most inflation targeting regimes have chosen a system where the interest rate 
decisions are taken by a board to secure a broad discussion of monetary policy before 
instrument use is decided. 
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Two questions need to be discussed: 
• Should the board consist of experts or non-experts?  
• How should the board be appointed? 
 
An argument used by Svensson (2001) is that experts could easily dominate non-
experts. A consequence could be that a board consisting of non-experts would not be 
sufficiently able to questions the central bank’s professional assessments. On the other 
hand we might imagine that a board consisting only of experts could be too focused 
on “mainstream economic theory” to understand the real economic consequences of 
their actions. 
 
Another argument for a board of experts is central bank independence. Politicians will 
appoint every board. But members of a board of experts will be appointed as experts, 
and will be held responsible if they do not act as such. If a board consists of people 
with mainly political experience, such members might be criticised if they do not 
follow a political line in their voting on the board. Both Sweden and the United 
Kingdom have only experts at their Executive Boards. 
 
In Norges Bank the five members of the Board who are not part of the Bank’s 
leadership are in all but name the appointees of political parties. It is, at the present 
time, difficult to give a fair assessment of how the current system of nominations will 
work under the new monetary regime. Until the end of 1998 Norwegian monetary 
policy was concentrated on stabilising the nominal exchange rate. Under that regime 
the Board had little influence on actual monetary policy. This might have affected the 
choice of candidates to the Board. A reasonable assumption is that the political parties 
in the future will pick their candidates with care so as to provide a strong and able 
Executive Board of Norges Bank. However, unlike a government or a parliament a 
political party has a narrow scope. This might create uncertainty around some 
nominees. It is also possible that political appointments might be the target of political 
pressure if minutes from board meetings are published. 
 
The current system seems to have given the Governor a strong position at Board 
meetings. It is the Bank’s Governor, not the Board, who is held accountable for 
monetary policy to the public. However, it is difficult to believe that any board would 
suggest a monetary policy that is not in line with the Inflation Reports of the Bank. 
Even a board consisting of only highly skilled economists would not have the 
resources to effectively present an alternative analysis to that of the Economics 
Department in the Bank. But it is important that the Board is able to ask critical 
questions to the analysis made by the Bank. Over time an effective board would be a 
board that forced the staff of Norges Bank to continuously make fresh reflections on 
how the economy works and how monetary instruments should be applied. It is also 
important that the questions asked reflect the real concerns among the Norwegian 
population. A well-qualified and representative Board can assure that the public 
remains confident in the Bank’s analysis. 
 
We believe that the current practice of appointing members to the Executive Board is 
sub-optimal. If political parties in everything but name appoint candidates to the 
Board this can increase the risk of factors other than competence being important 
when electing Board members.  
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Should this imply that the government instead names a Board consisting of only 
trained economists? People with the right experience do not need a degree in 
economics to have informed opinions about monetary policy. The only formal 
requirement should be that a Board member has the skills necessary to understand the 
work of Norges Bank. Effort should probably be made to assure that the Board does 
reflect a broad sample of backgrounds. Given the small number of academic 
economists in Norway and the close connection between academic circles and Norges 
Bank, we would argue that Board membership should not be limited to academic 
economists.  
 
It might well be that political parties should continue to nominate candidates. It is 
however important that the parties take care to find persons who fulfil the above 
criteria. The parties should also nominate a number of qualified candidates, giving the 
government a real choice when choosing members to the Executive Board. We would 
like to add that if a Board were to be appointed purely on the basis of skill it would be 
natural to publish the minutes from Board meetings. 
 
 
3.4 The focus on nominal exchange rates and the inflation targets – is the 
economic policy guidelines consistent in the long term? 
 
In the new regulation of the Norwegian monetary policy, the two first sections read:  
 
“Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s national 
and international value, contributing to stable expectations concerning 
exchange rate developments. At the same time, monetary policy shall underpin 
fiscal policy by contributing to stable developments in output and 
employment.” 
 
Norges Bank’s implementation of monetary policy shall, in accordance with 
the first paragraph, be oriented towards low and stable inflation.(…) The 
operational target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price inflation 
of approximately 2.5 per cent over time. 
 
 
Does this imply a possible inconsistency in the Norwegian monetary regime? As we 
know, most of our trading partners have inflation targets below 2.5 per cent. The 
Norwegian regulation of monetary policy seems to imply an expectation of a real 
appreciation of the Norwegian exchange rate through prices instead of nominal 
exchange rate adjustments.  
 
The planned increased domestic usage of oil revenues should be expected to cause a 
real appreciation of the exchange rate. Production resources need to reallocated, as the 
demand for domestic services rise. This creates a demand for change in relative 
prices. Such a change can come either through a nominal exchange rate appreciation 
or a relative shift in the Norwegian price level compared with our main trading 
partners. Our main trading partner, Euroland, seems (in effect) to have an inflation 
target between 1.5 and 2 per cent. Sweden has an inflation target of 2 per cent. Given 
a stable exchange rate, the Norwegian inflation target has a ½ per cent (or somewhat 
above) implied real appreciation built into the mandate.  
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Norges Bank has stated that it will not allow high domestic inflation to facilitate the 
real appreciation of the Norwegian krone. It is possible that a real appreciation of a ½ 
per cent is exactly what is needed in order to accommodate the increased spending of 
oil revenues. But there are considerable uncertainties here. 
 
Domestic spending of oil revenues is a very important political topic. The bank’s 
assessment of the impact of a more expansionary policy is vital, both for the fiscal 
authorities and for the market participants. The Bank should not be expected to 
publish precise exchange rate forecasts. However, the Bank should attempt to 
illustrate the combined impacts of changes in fiscal policy and interest rate responses 
given different exchange rate profiles. Such a clarification can help stabilise long-term 
expectations for the nominal exchange rate. That might reduce the short-term 
volatility in exchange rate. 
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4. Can the high Norwegian interest rates be justified? 
 
4.1 Norwegian nominal and real rates are higher than in Euroland 
 
The most striking aspect of the Norwegian monetary policy in the past year is that 
interest rates have been far above interest rates in almost all other industrialised 
countries. We start the discussion on the monetary policy from this position. 
 
In fact, Norwegian interest rates have remained far above Euroland level for a long 
period of time, see figure 4.1. The key sight deposit rate of the Norwegian Central 
Bank has been maintained at a high 7 per cent rate since September 2000, while ECB 
has cut its signal rate from 4.75 per cent to 3.75 per cent. Currently (September 21), 
the 3-month Nibor interest rate is 6.94 per cent, while the yield on long term (10 
years) government bonds is 6.4 per cent. This implies that the interest differentials 
versus Euroland amount to almost 3.5 percentage points for corresponding 3-month 
interest rates and 1.5 percentage points for 10 years government bonds, see figure 4.2 
How can these high Norwegian interest rate levels and interest rate differentials 
versus Euroland be justified?  
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It is useful to adopt a rather broad perspective and consider this issue in the present 
chapter, before we turn to a more detailed discussion of the interest rate setting and 
communication of the Norwegian Central Bank in the next chapter. As a point of 
departure, we note that Norwegian core inflation is running at or somewhat below 2.5 
per cent y/y rate for the moment. The corresponding headline rate is 2.7 per cent y/y. 
The equivalent annual inflation rates in Euroland are 2 per cent and 2.6 per cent 
respectively. Thus, inflation is not much higher than in Euroland. The difference 
between nominal rates are almost entirely due to difference in real interest rates. 
 
According to projections in the latest inflation report of the Norwegian Central Bank, 
maintenance of the current level at 7 per cent of the key interest rates is consistent 
with 2.5 per cent annual inflation in 2003 – just as targeted.  
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Figure 4.2  
10 y Government bond yields
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4.2 The short-run macroeconomic picture - Binding capacity constraints 
 
The Norwegian economy is working very close to full capacity. This is most clearly 
illustrated by the developments in the labour market. The unemployment rate has 
been stable at levels between 2.5 and 3 per cent of the labour force according to 
figures from the public labour market office or somewhat above 3 per cent measured 
by the Labour market survey (Arbeidskraftundersøkelsen, see figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3 
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Comparing with unemployment rates around 9 per cent in the largest Euroland 
economies, we conclude that such a huge difference must matter for differences in the 
underlying inflationary pressure. Hence, we believe that this accounts for stronger 
wage–costs impulses in Norway than in Euroland – even if we take into account that 
the NAIRU (The Non-Accelerating-Inflation-Rate-of-Unemployment) is much lower 
in Norway than in Euroland and that the highly co-ordinated wage-setting in Norway 
has (so far) been fairly successful in terms of avoiding excessive nominal wage 
increases. 
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The actual and potential strength of aggregate demand in the Norwegian economy is 
strong compared to many other OECD countries for the moment. This is mainly due 
to the financial position of the oil-rich Norwegian public sector. In Norway, the 
government collects in effect approximately 90 per cent of the net cash flow from the 
petroleum sector due to taxation and direct involvement in the sector. According to 
the petroleum fund strategy of the government, the income from the petroleum sector 
is allocated to a well-diversified portfolio of foreign financial assets. Currently, the 
petroleum fund amounts to more than 500 billions NOK, or approximately 45 per cent 
of mainland GDP, and the size of the fund is increasing fast. The petroleum fund 
strategy is accompanied by a brand new explicit “spending rule”, which states that an 
estimated 4 per cent real return on the financial assets should be spent every year – on 
average.16 This fairly conservative spending rule, which implies increasing 
consumption of petroleum-income over time, means that: 
 
• Fiscal policy will give a constant demand-stimulation in many years to come. 
Moreover, it is not hard to imagine situations where the outcome of the political 
negotiations about the fiscal budget will lead to more fiscal stimulus than implied 
by the spending rule. 
• The fiscal strategy is consistent with a real appreciation involving transfers of 
resources from sectors producing tradeables to sectors producing non-tradeables. 
 
The potential strength of Norwegian private demand is also more impressive than in 
most other OECD economies even though recent figures on, for example, retail sales 
volume and car sales indicate that the high interest rate level curbs the spending level 
somewhat. We observe that the financial position of the total household sector is 
excellent, the household saving rate is at a fairly high 6.5 per cent level, workers are 
enjoying a very high degree of job market security, the wage growth has been 
satisfactory and the prospects for (minor) tax cuts seem good. Thus, it is very hard to 
imagine any significant downward adjustment of consumer demand in the short and 
intermediate run.  
 
The overall short-run macroeconomic picture in Norway is characterised by strong 
domestic demand impulses and binding capacity constraints on the supply side. In 
addition to the very tight labour market, productivity growth has been very low in the 
last couple of years as well. The current fairly favourable inflationary picture reflects 
that fiscal discipline has been satisfactory, while the fairly high nominal interest rates 
contribute to keep private demand growth in check. Looking ahead, our assessment is 
that interest rates must remain significantly above the Euroland level in the next 
couple of years because  
 
i) the domestic demand pressure is likely to remain stronger in Norway than in 
Euroland and ii)  
ii) the capacity level on the supply side is not likely to improve much over such a 
horizon.  
 
                                                 
16 The government stresses that business cycle conditions may lead to temporary deviations from this 
strategy. 
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We can, however, imagine potential small downward adjustments of the key interest 
rates in response to for example weaker international impulses, but this does not alter 
our basic statement: The macroeconomic characteristics of the Norwegian mainland 
economy calls for a maintained high interest rate differential versus Euroland, at least 
as long as the Norwegian krone exchange rate does not appreciate substantially. 
 
Supply side policies 
We will also argue that the binding capacity constraints should lead to an intensified 
focus on the supply-side of the economy. We note that the growth of the Norwegian 
mainland economy has been weak recently. According to the “Revised National 
Budget” for 2001 of The Ministry of Finance, the actual and estimated annual GDP 
growth rates of the mainland economy amount to respectively 1.0 per cent, 1.8 per 
cent, 1.5 per cent and 1.8 per cent in the years from 1999 to 2002. These figures 
reflect to a large extent low growth in labour supply and very modest productivity 
growth. While we recognise that productivity is volatile due to cyclical factors 
(among other things) and the period 1999-2002 is short, we will still highlight the 
need for structural policy measures (for example reforms of the tax-transfer system), 
which contribute to improvements in productivity and increases in labour supply. This 
will benefit growth in general and reduce the need for high interest rates in particular. 
 
 
 
4.3 The long run interest rate differential – Is the inflation target credible? 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the interest rate differential between 
Norway and Euroland for 10 year government bonds amounts to 1.5 percentage point. 
The implied differential is lower at the half of the yield curve, but are still quite high 
at 0.75 – 1 percentage point. And nobody can claim that high bond yields are due to 
worries for the present or future financial position of the Kingdom of Norway. 
 
The obvious explanation could be that the 2.5 per cent inflation target of the 
Norwegian Central Bank is not credible. However, the latest consensus forecast (from 
September) shows an average expected 2.0 per cent inflation rate in 2002 and recent 
model calculations from Statistics Norway show an inflation rate as low as 1.7 per 
cent in 2002 (and 2.3 per cent in 2003). It might therefore be worth considering other 
evidence that can account for at least parts of the differential. 
 
Some technical explanations might be worth pointing out: 
• The gap between the 2.5 per cent inflation target in Norway and the 2 per cent 
target or rather inflation ceiling of the European Central Bank may account for 
approximately 0.5 percentage point of this differential. Just in order to keep real 
interest rates at the same level, Norwegian rates must be higher than European 
rates.  
• If the market participants do not expect a depreciation of the Norwegian krone 
exchange rate vs. the Euro equivalent to the differential in inflation, the theory of 
uncovered interest rate parity implies that Norwegian interest rates should be 
equal to European rates. However, most bond market investors hedge their 
currency positions. As Norwegian short-term rates are high, the hedging cost for 
covering the currency risk is high and as the yield curve is sloping downwards a 
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long bond position in Norway has a substantial cost of carry. Hence, if the 
investor has a quite short term investment horizon and he is not convinced that the 
case for bond yield narrowing is to be realised short term, it’s not an attractive 
case, even if its judged to be a fair bet long term. Among traditional money 
market or bond market institutional investors, there are not many who are able or 
willing to take such long-term uncovered positions, betting that the long bond 
yield differential will not be accommodated by an equivalent weakening of the 
Norwegian krone, say the next 10 years. 
• It is also likely that the fact that the Norwegian bond market is fairly small and 
that is has become very illiquid in periods influences the risk perception of the 
investors and leads to a certain risk premium.  
 
Formal theoretical analyses of an economy’s dynamic adjustment process to a 
windfall gain shows that the optimal adjustment path involves a real exchange rate 
appreciation (and possibly overshooting) and a presumably long period with high 
interest rates.17 If this is true, parts of the interest rate differential on long term bonds 
simply reflects that the real interest rate level will remain higher in Norway than in 
Euroland for a fairly long time span. This makes sense if one believes that individuals 
are stimulated by an intertemporal substitution effect to postpone spending at the 
initial stages. Moreover, this also supports the view that the optimal policy mix for 
Norway involves a combination of contractionary monetary policy in combination 
with a somewhat more relaxed fiscal policy stance. 
 
The Norwegian exchange rate poses a challenge to these views. If Norwegian interest 
rates stay substantially above international rates for a long period and its becoming 
widely expected that a nominal appreciation of the NOK is the most likely mechanism 
for adjusting the economy to a higher level of spending of oil revenues, we assume 
that both the corporate sector and the household sector would increase their demand 
for foreign currency borrowing, either through Norwegian banks or directly abroad. 
The reason is that many of these “end-users” have the risk capacity to take a long-
term uncovered currency position. Without intervention in the foreign exchange 
market by the Norges Bank, this capital import would lead to the desired appreciation 
of the Norwegian krone, but with a lesser impact on the intertemporal substitution. In 
addition, a stronger currency will reduce the need for a high Norwegian interest rate 
in order to stabilise the inflation since a strong currency reduces prices on imported 
goods and dampens the pressure in the labour market through the loss of 
competitiveness and employment in the exposed sectors. If so, the currency will “do 
most of the job”, and really high Norwegian rates are not sustainable.  
 
 
 
Recently, the Norwegian krone exchange rate has appreciated substantially, albeit 
from lower levels than before the 1998 currency and interest rate turmoil, and the 
krone is not yet “strong”, see figure 4.4. However, this appreciation could be a first 
signal that the policy mix is not sustainable. 
 
                                                 
17 Recent theoretical analyses along these lines are provided by Mork (2000), who considers a 
theoretical framework which capture the main characteristics of the Norwegian oil-economy in a very 
explicit way, and Steigum and Thøgersen (2001) who considers a slightly more generalized framework. 
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Figure 4.4 
vs 3 months interest rate differential vs. Euroland
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We can conclude that there are still substantial uncertainties about the path of 
Norwegian interest rates compared with our main trading partners and the path of the 
nominal Norwegian exchange rate. These are questions that warrant more research. 
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5. Evaluating the forecasts and instrument/policy changes of 
Norges Bank from June 2000 to August 2001 
 
5.1 The bank’s objectives 
 
According to the new regulation of monetary policy Norges Bank should keep 
inflation at a target of 2.5 per cent within a band of +/-1 percentage point. In the 
period between January 1999 and February 2001 the goal was to keep nominal 
exchange rates stable over time. Norges Bank interpreted this as a need to keep 
inflation in line with the Euro zone. As the EBC’s target was interpreted as 2 per cent 
or below, the implied inflation target was 2 per cent or below in Norway too. 
 
These goals are quite clear, and it should be possible to assess whether Norges Bank 
has fulfilled its duties in a proper manner. However, two things make the connection 
between implemented policy and actual outcome very difficult to evaluate. First, the 
only instrument actively used by the Bank today is the overnight deposit rate in the 
Norwegian money market. Theory does not give any clear picture of exactly how 
future inflation responds to changes in this interest rate. Adding to this, some of the 
probably most important transmission channels for monetary policy in a small open 
economy, like the exchange rate channel, have especially ambivalent empirical 
records. 
 
Second, Norges Bank makes its policy decisions based on forecasts. As is shown by 
Hendry () the most important cause of forecast errors in econometric models are 
structural shifts. The problem with structural shifts is that they by definition are 
unpredictable. A good forecaster will not attempt to foretell structural shifts, only to 
adjust the model when the shifts are identified. 
 
The implication is that Norges Bank can hardly be held strictly responsible for actual 
outcomes of inflation. If transmission channels change or if structural shifts occur, 
inflation will certainly differ from the goal set by the Bank without the Bank being 
able to influence this very much.  
 
Rather than evaluating the effects of interest rate policy for inflation two years hence 
we need to concentrate on whether interest rates are reasonably based on current 
available information. Are there reasons to question the forecasts made? Does the use 
of instruments seem fair given the goal of the Bank? Over time we need to evaluate 
the learning curve of the Bank. If the interest setting made two years ago seems to 
have failed with regard to inflation or output volatility, why is it so? Has the Bank 
taken this experience into account when making new decisions? 
 
Has the inflation targets been reached? 
Before we discuss Norges Bank’s economic assessments and it’s policy, its however 
useful to assess whether the Bank has met its targets. 
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Figure 5.1 
Change y/y
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Since the introduction of the implied inflation target of 2 per cent or below in early 
1999, the average headline consumer price inflation has been 2.9per cent (figure 5.1). 
However, a substantial part of this inflation has been due to special factors like higher 
energy cost (both electricity and gasoline) and increased indirect taxes. A core 
inflation rate, calculated by taking out the impact from energy and indirect taxes, here 
measured by the method applied by First Securities, has averaged 2.3 per cent.  Thus, 
the actual rate of consumer price inflation has been markedly or somewhat above the 
implied target, depending on the choice of inflation measure.  
 
Even if Norges Bank was not explicit on the headline/core concept in 1999, our 
understanding is that the Bank has emphasised core inflation as the most relevant 
target for monetary policy. Specifically, in its inflation forecasts, the Bank has 
accounted for impacts of special factors like energy prices or taxes. (See our comment 
on the CPIXE later in this chapter).  
 
The rate of inflation in Norway has been averaging app. 1 percentage point above the 
inflation rate in Euroland, both measured by the headline and core inflation. The 
differential has narrowed substantially during recent months, and the headline 
inflation in Norway has fallen below the Euroland rate of inflation, partly due to a cut 
in VAT on food.  (Se figure 5.2) 
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Figure 5.2 
Consumer price inflation, Norway vs. EMU
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5.2 Forecasts of mainland GDP and inflation for 2001 and 2002 
 
A forecast is the best prediction of future outcomes at a given point of time. To make 
a wrong forecast might be unfortunate, but is not necessarily a reason for critique if 
the forecast was based on the best current knowledge at the time when made. 
GDP forecasts 
In figure 5.3 and 5.4 we have plotted the forecast of mainland GDP and 12 month 
change in the CPI for 2001 made by Norges Bank, Statistics Norway (SSB), the 
Ministry of Finance and Consensus Forecasts.19 As we see there are trends in both 
forecasts: the estimate of GDP has tended downwards, and the estimate of CPI has 
tended upwards as time has passed. In figure 3 and 4 we have the same presentation 
of the forecast for 2002. With the exception of a substantial downward revision of 
expected GDP growth early in 2000 these forecasts have not been adjusted much over 
the last year. 
 
With regard to projections of inflation for 2002 there seems to be a considerable 
discrepancy between Norges Bank and Statistics Norway (currently 0.75 percentage 
points). This is mainly due to the fact that Norges Bank factors out the effect of a 
change in the VAT on food, effective in July 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Norges Bank forecasts are published in the Inflation Report, previously four times a year (at present 
three times). Statistics Norway publishes forecasts four times a year. The Ministry of Finance publishes 
forecasts for one year ahead in the National Budget, issued in October, and the Revised National 
Budget, issued in May. Consensus Forecast is a monthly report containing the views of a number of 
private sector economists. We report the average values. Note that the forecasts of Statistics Norway 
are also included as one of the forecasts in the Consensus Report. 
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Figure 5.4 
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For GDP in 2001 Norges Bank made the same forecast in June 2001 as it made in 
December 1999: an expected GDP growth of 1.5 per cent. The development between 
these two points of time does however show how forecasts change as information 
changes. In a short period in the spring of 2000 Norges Bank adjusted its forecast 
upwards to 2 per cent. The Bank then adjusted it down to a low of 1.25 per cent. Over 
all the adjustments have been fairly minor, and no substantial revision has been made 
of expected growth in 2001 over this period. We see that Norges Bank, while in 
periods slightly more pessimistic than the other three, is generally well in line with 
other forecasters in the market. The international downturn so far in 2001 has not 
been reflected in the Banks expectations for the Norwegian economy. 
 
Inflation forecasts 
The predictions of inflation for 2001 have changed more markedly. Norges Bank has 
increased their forecast with 1.5 percentage points over this period, see figure 5.5. 
Why have the forecasts of inflation changed from the end of 1999?  
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Figure 5.5 
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In the Inflation Report 2/00 expected inflation is adjusted up by 0.5 percentage points. 
In a press statement Norges Bank argues that 
 
“[t]he upward revision primarily reflects higher labour costs and a weaker krone 
exchange rate, but a slightly stronger external inflationary impetus is also a 
contributing factor.” 
 
The downward revision in expected GDP growth at the same time is explained by 
reduced supply of labour due to additional vacation days. The Bank further states that 
 
“[t]he risk of a pronounced downturn over the next two years is limited.” 
 
Expected inflation for 2001 is further revised up by 0.25 percentage points in Inflation 
Report 3/00, mainly due to effects of the surge in oil prices.  
 
Expected inflation for 2002 is revised downwards by 0.25 percentage points, as the 
effect of increasing oil prices is expected to fade over time. See figure 5.6 
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Which interest rates, exchange rates should be used when inflation is 
forecasted? 
In Inflation Report 4/00 expected inflation for 2001 is further adjusted up by 0.25 
percentage point because of the interest rates used in the projection were lowered.  At 
that time Norges Bank used the implied forward rates, which had experienced a 
pronounced fall. This shows the problem of using forward rates in central bank 
forecasting when the market and Bank do not share the expectations of future 
monetary policy.  
 
In Inflation Report 2/01 Norges Bank changed the technical assumptions of the future 
interest rate. The Bank now assumes current rates to be unchanged for two years 
before the rates fall gradually to the forward curve. This change in the projection of 
interest rates had little effect for the 2001 inflation forecast, which is adjusted up by 
0.25 percentage points from Inflation Report 1/01. This time it is due to an increase in 
the cost of electricity. Forecasts of core inflation for 2002 and 2003 is set to 2.5 per 
cent, slightly higher than in the previous report. This is due to “somewhat higher cost 
inflation than previously anticipated.” (Inflation Report 2/01) 
 
In their forecasts Norges Bank uses as a technical assumption that the exchange rate 
will remain at the average level of the last three months. In the current situation, with 
a high (and increasing) differential between Norwegian and other European interest 
rates the exchange rate might add an extra uncertainty to the projections of future 
inflation. Norges Bank should discuss implications of different assumptions of the 
nominal exchange rate. 
 
 
5.3 Assessing changes in monetary policy instruments 
 
Problems to be accounted for 
During the last five years Norway has battled a combination of forces: 
• High credit growth. However, financial stability has so far been good 
• Low unemployment and a limited supply of new labour 
• Some asset price instability (especially in the housing market) 
• Slightly expansionary fiscal policy 
• Large current account surpluses and a substantial accumulation in the Norwegian 
Petroleum Fund 
• Somewhat higher wage growth than in main trading partners 
• Lower productivity growth than in main trading partners 
• Slowing growth in real mainland GDP 
• Stable inflation about one percentage point above the rate in the Euro zone 
• Cost push through high energy prices 
• Considerable international uncertainty 
 
The essence has probably been a better life for most Norwegians, a considerably 
better life for some Norwegians, and a nightmare for all responsible economic 
decision-makers. Many questions need to be answered: 
• To which degree should the Norwegian government allow the flow of oil money 
to increase public and private consumption today?  
• How will such an increase affect Norwegian productivity growth over time?  
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• Is pressure in the labour supply putting a pressure on wages that might undermine 
Norwegian competitiveness?  
• Should the real appreciation made necessary by increased public spending be 
reflected in price inflation or nominal exchange rate appreciation?  
• Is the high credit growth a danger to economic stability over time?  
• Will an international downturn affect the Norwegian economy, or will lower 
demand for traded products be compensated by fiscal stimulus and increased 
demand for labour in the public sector? 
 
In short, Norway is attempting to avoid “Dutch disease” without restricting the 
consumption increase made possible by the oil income too much. That is not a simple 
job. 
 
Throughout the last three years Norges Bank has stated its priorities. The goal of the 
Bank is to keep inflation low and stable. One can, ex post, question the position of the 
Bank during the spring of 1999 when the emphasis was on deflation. Uncertainty 
about international developments does however explain that stance. Since then 
Norges Bank has tended to focus on the three main threats to stable inflation over 
time:  
• the pressure in the labour market 
• the credit growth 
• the risk of a sharp increase in public spending undermining the long-term growth 
prospects in the Norwegian economy.  
 
The period of interest rate change 
From June 14 till September 20 2000 Norges Bank raised its interest rates three times 
with a total of 1.25 percentage points. Over the period the deposit rate moved from 
5.75 per cent to 7 per cent. The increases in 2000 came on June 14 with 0.5 
percentage, on August 9 with 0.5 percentage points, and on September 20 with 0.25 
percentage points. On the first two instances the increase was followed with a warning 
of expected future interest rate increases. After the third increase the expectations 
were characterised as neutral. 
 
The increase on June 14 came one week ahead of the new Inflation Report. The main 
reasons for the increase in inflationary expectations in this report are wage pressure, a 
weak exchange rate and some international price pressure. Overall the wage pressure 
is probably the main factor contributing to a sustained interest rate increase. However, 
an increase in interest rates internationally might have contributed to the weak 
exchange rate. The ECB increased its interest rates by about 1 percentage point over 
the same period. There are reasons to believe that if Norges Bank had not conducted 
interest rate increases, and the interest rate differential had fallen, the exchange rate 
could have weakened further.  
 
The only good way to explain the gradual increase in interest rates, made over three 
Board meetings, is as a result of interest rate smoothing. In figure 5.7 we graph the 
deposit rate, the three-month money market rate, and the implied three-month forward 
rate. As we see the money market rates increase by 0.5 per cent after the Bank made 
its announcement of an interest rate hike and declared that it expect future 
adjustments of the interest rate to be upward. When the Bank declares that it expects 
the probability of an upward change to equal the probability of a downward change, 
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the market stays put. This reveals substantial confidence in the Banks policy 
statements. 
 
Due to market reactions on the statements about future policy, the effects of an 
interest rate hike in this period came in advance of the actual hike. A hike of more 
than 0.5 per cent at one time would however be beyond market expectations, and 
could have had destabilising effects. As the Bank has now exchanged their policy of 
giving statements about future expected changes in the interest rates with statements 
of future expected inflation it will be interesting to see how the markets react to the 
new procedures.  
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Explanation to figure 5.7: If there are not any expectations of changes in Norges Banks signal 
rates, the spread between Norges Bank’s deposit rate and 3 months money market rates 
normally equals 0.3 - 0.4 percentage points. On the figure above we have deducted this 
spread from the actual 3 months money market interest rate. In addition we have added a 
calculated 3 months money market rate, 3 months forward (and added a small risk premium). 
Thus, we show which deposit rate the market participants expect in three to four months time. 
If the market always was right, the market’s expectations would lead Norges Bank deposit 
rate by three to four months. The “mistakes” have not been dramatic, and changes in the 
policy stance have been usually been well understood by the market, and in some instances 
anticipated. During the last year, the deviation between the expected deposit rate three 
months and the actual rate has stayed within a band of +/- 0.5 percentage points. The shaded 
areas represent periods of easing (January 99  - 4th quarter 99) and tightening (April 2000 - 
September 2000).   
 
Following the terror attack against the U.S, concerted interest rate cuts abroad and the melt 
down on the stock markets, the market expected Norges Bank to follow suite at September 19, 
at least that the Bank signalled the possibility of lower rates. However, Norges Bank did not 
decide to do any policy changes, at money market rates rose substantially. As the stock 
markets world wide imploded the following days, short term rates again fell markedly. Today, 
the market expects a sharp reduction in Norges Bank’s deposit rate within just some few 
months. 
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The period of no change 
From October 2000 the interest rates have been kept unchanged. However, a fall in 
interest rates abroad has affected the interest spread compared with major trading 
partners. Over the last eight months many central banks have adjusted their target 
rates down. Norges Bank has thus far argued that the signs of an international 
downturn will not affect the Norwegian economy sufficiently to warrant a change in 
interest rates. Instead the Bank seems to be of the opinion that structural aspects of the 
Norwegian economy, especially the pressure in the labour market, has made 
necessary a slightly more restrictive monetary policy. The Bank has attained this by 
letting the interest rate differential increase in the short end. 
 
A question, not fully answered by the Bank, is whether Norway is insulated from the 
international cycle by the public sector or by a counter-cyclical private industry. Both 
factors probably play a part. It is however of some importance whether the one or the 
other is most important. The government surplus in Norway makes public 
employment more flexible than in most other European countries. One should 
therefore be careful to concentrate too much on the unemployment rate as an indicator 
of pressure in the Norwegian economy. If the need for labour in the private sector 
shrinks, wage pressure might well abate. Currently no signs of a private downfall are 
clearly present, so Norges Bank is probably correct not to adjust its policy just yet.20 
The still strong growth in credit also makes a decrease in interest rates difficult to 
justify. However, there is now considerable uncertainty attached to international 
growth prospects. The effects of letting the interest rate differential increase further 
might be problematic. We are as yet uncertain as to how this will affect nominal 
exchange rates. Norges Bank might soon be in the same position as the Bank of 
England. It might have to cope with strong internal demand on the one hand and 
problems in the export sector at the other hand. See also discussions on the exchange 
rate in chapter 3.4 and 4.4. 
 
                                                 
20 According to Consensus Forecasts for July 2001 a 100 per cent of respondents among their panellists 
think that current monetary policy in Norway is “about right”. 50 per cent do however feel that future 
monetary policy should be more stimulative. 
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Box 2. International uncertainty 
 
 
International uncertainty 
 
In Inflation Report 4/00 Norges Bank evaluates their forecasts for 1999. The forecasts of 1999 
changed radically from December 1997 to December 1998. Neither number was however 
correct. The main conclusion is that errors in forecasting Norwegian numbers for 1999 
generally occurred because international conditions did not follow the assumed projections. 
 
The problems of predicting international conditions becomes clear when comparing the 
leading comments by the deputy governor Jarle Bergo in Inflation Report 1/01 and governor 
Svein Gjedrem in Inflation Report 2/01.  
 
Inflation Report 1/01 (March): 
 
“It is uncertain how deep and prolonged the [US] slowdown will be. […] In Europe, on the 
other hand, there are prospects of an upturn.” 
 
Inflation Report 2/01 (June): 
 
“The slowdown in world economic growth has been substantial and there is a risk of slower 
growth and a longer downturn. […] The slowdown in the US has had a rapid impact on 
economic developments in many Asian countries, and now growth is also slowing in the EU 
and other European countries.” 
 
We expect Norges Bank to be even more downbeat in its assessment of the international 
environment in its October inflation report. 
 
We must accept that a substantial part of the uncertainty in economic projections for Norway 
will be the projections of economic developments outside Norway. That is the necessary 
implication of globalisation, and it was so even before that word was invented. 
 
Which implication should Norges Bank draw from this? The understanding of how the 
international economy interacts is clearly incomplete. But this is not a problem contained to 
Norges Bank. The ECB made a number of statements during the winter of this year arguing 
that a downturn in the US had little effect on the European economy, statements they today 
probably regret.  
 
Multinational organisations have of course worked with multinational models for a long time. 
It is however not clear that the work of OECD and IMF is on a form that answers to the needs 
of inflation targeting central banks. Maybe should more international effort should be put 
down into research on how to better understand the transmission channels in the global 
economy, and formalise these in a framework that can be applied in national decision- 
making? The uncertainty in international projections has probably been underestimated as a 
problem in the inflation targeting literature, and more work in this area must be in the interest 
of central banks all over the world. 
 
Both Inflation Reports 1/01 and 2/01 include inserts that discuss international transmission 
channels. Norges Bank should take care to illustrate the impacts of different scenarios for 
international growth and inflation rate on the expected inflation development in Norway. 
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5.4 Changes in interest rates, the level of interest rates and inflation 
 
Last year Norges Bank Watch 2000 argued that Norges Bank needed to clarify and 
present their views on the relationship between the interest rate and inflation. The 
background was that sensitivity analyses in a previous inflation report indicated that 
the link between interest rates and inflation was extremely weak. Not surprisingly, 
these somewhat depressing (from a monetary policy point of view) calculations 
attracted a lot of attention in the media.  
 
The request for clarification was in effect answered by means of an informative insert 
in Inflation Report 4/00. Here Norges Bank points out aspects that are influenced by a 
change in interest rates, and aspects that influence the effect of a change in interest 
rates. Consideration is taken for the effect on the debt/income ratio for different levels 
of debt, for the effect on wage and profit formation under different assumptions of 
capacity utilisation, for the foreign exchange channel, and for different forms of 
expectations. Later in the report the Bank discuss the inflation forecast under various 
projections of the interest rate. 
 
Several interesting observations are made. For example the Bank finds that a one per 
cent increase in interest rates over a two year period will reduce CPI inflation by 
about 0.1 percentage points in the first year – provided that the labour market is tight. 
The reduction in the second year would be 0.2 percentage points and in the third year 
0.3 percentage points. In a labour market with considerable slack the effect would be 
about a third of this. If uncovered interest rate parity holds (that is, if nominal 
exchange rates react to the change in nominal interest rates according to the UIP 
hypothesis), the effect on the CPI would occure faster. Given a tight labour market, 
one could expect a change in CPI inflation of about 0.25 percentage points in the first 
year. The effect through the exchange rate channel would be even stronger if the 
markets believed the change in interest rates to have a duration of more than two 
years. The magnitude of the effects would also depend on the degree of forward-
looking expectations. The presentation ends with a discussion of how these factors 
play a role when estimating uncertainty intervals for evaluating the effect of an 
interest rate change. 
 
Some questions still remain unanswered, however. First, while the exposition in 4/00 
focuses on interest rate changes, the Bank does not ask how a change in the use of an 
instrument affects the yield curve. As pointed out in chapter 4 there are reasons to 
believe that a change in the short-term rate can have rather odd effects in the long end 
of the yield curve. This might affect the real economic implications of an instrument 
adjustment.  
 
Secondly, the discussion in 4/00 focuses only on the change in the interest rate. It is 
likely that the level of the interest rate might be crucial. We conjecture that the real 
interest rate level has non-linear effects on the real economy. From the Norwegian 
experience during the 1980s we learned that a period with very low real interest rates 
followed by a period with high real interest rates might have been one of the factors 
that led to problems in the banking sector. A given adjustment of the key interest rates 
should not be viewed independently from the level of interest rates, both real and 
nominal.  
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Finally, how the interest rate setting influences the economy depends not only on the 
size of the adjustment and the level, but also on the interest rate differential versus 
other countries. Norges Bank discusses the effect of a change in the interest rate 
provided that uncovered interest rate parity holds. But much of the same effect would 
occur as a result of a change in interest rates abroad, especially in Euroland. A change 
in the interest differential will also affect other variables, like foreign investments in 
Norway or Norwegian borrowing abroad.  
 
In its various analyses Norges Bank considers the issues mentioned in this subsection 
explicitly or implicitly. Still, we believe that Norges Bank may benefit from 
presentations of additional explicit analyses of these issues in future Inflation Reports. 
We believe that Norges Bank should continue a public discussion of how monetary 
policy instruments affect the economy. 
 
 
5.5 CPIXE – core inflation 
The regulation of monetary policy states that  
 
”[i]n general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in 
interest rates, taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances shall 
not be taken into account.”  
 
Norges Bank has pointed out that one can not simply ignore temporary disturbances 
as these  
 
“… can be a source of accelerating inflation via spillover effects on other prices 
and wages.” 
 
However, temporary disturbances are outside the control of the Bank. It seems 
reasonable that the inflation target focuses on the part of inflation that is, at least to 
some degree, within the control of the Bank. 
 
By temporary disturbances are normally understood fluctuations in energy prices, 
although the concept is not limited to energy (an other example could be an increase 
in food prices due to supply side problems). Norges Bank has therefore presented a 
new concept of Norwegian inflation, the CPIXE. This is a measure of the CPI when 
direct effects of excise duties and energy prices are excluded. Effects of interest rate 
changes are not excluded. However, Norges Bank expects these to be negligible. 
 
The CPIXE is normally more stable than the CPI as energy prices is a volatile 
composite in the CPI. Whether the CPIXE inflation is higher or lower than CPI 
inflation does of course depend on a number of circumstances. For 2002, when the 
effect of a reduction in the value added tax on food will reduce the CPI, we must 
expect that the CPIXE inflation exceeds CPI inflation, confer the discussion in ch. 4, 
while it headline CPI has been far higher than the CPIXE in 2001. 
 
Statistics Norway (SSB) has this far not adopted the concept of CPIXE, although they 
do publish a CPI index excluding energy prices. Given the role of the CPIXE in 
current Norges Bank policy it is a need for SSB to publish monthly CPIXE. Norges 
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Bank and the SSB should agree on the concept of how to define the CPIXE. There is 
also a need for historical series of the index.  
 
Is the CPIXE the relevant measure of Norges Bank inflation target? It is clear that 
although this index does not answer the monetary policy regulation perfectly, it comes 
reasonably close to doing so. Norges Bank has on a number of occasions stated that 
they will take the steps required if they believe that temporary price changes might 
affect expectations of inflation in other sectors. One need also distinguish between 
energy prices. In principle, there is a difference between an increase in electricity 
prices due to an increase in demand, and a hike in electricity price due to lack of rain 
or high oil prices due to a supply cut decided by OPEC. However, almost every 
significant change in energy prices is due to supply changes.  
 
Even so, how an inflation targeting central bank should respond to changes in energy 
prices is still an active research topic. As a first step the focus on the CPIXE seems 
like a sensible solution.  
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6. Communicating with the public 
 
The official communication of Norges Bank seems to fulfil the expectations of a “best 
practice” inflation targeting central bank. The Inflation Report is now published three 
times a year. It is a clear, well-written and informative exposition. Speeches and 
articles are all published on a user-friendly homepage – “www.norges-bank.no”. All 
material is published in both Norwegian and English. The homepage would be even 
more user friendly if supplied with a search engine. The Bank’s leadership is available 
for comments on the press conference after Board meetings. The press conferences 
have an informative and open character. 
 
Norges Bank has emphasised the importance of good communication with the 
markets. This does not imply that the markets should be able to predict every action 
taken by the Bank. But Norges Bank’s policy should be so well understood that the 
use of monetary instruments does not cause unnecessary volatility in the financial 
markets. In other words: instrument use shall be in accordance with stated policy. 
When policy is changed one shall, under normal circumstances, first inform the 
markets of the change, and then adjust instruments according to the new policy. As far 
as we can understand Norges Bank has fulfilled this requirement.  
 
Some small comments could however be made: 
• Norges Bank currently use a technical assumption of unchanged interest rates in 
their inflation forecasts. If the inflation target is not met under this technical 
assumption, it will be very useful if the Bank illustrates how alternative interest 
rates scenarios would make the target achievable in model.  
• A question can be raised about whether to publish minutes from Board meetings. 
The premises for decisions about use of monetary instruments are presented in the 
press release. However, as we discuss in chapter 3, depending on how the Board is 
composed it might be in the interest of the public to obtain information about the 
work at the Board. This is at present usual practice in inflation targeting regimes 
where the Board members are chosen based on expertise. Publishing minutes from 
Board meetings might increase the understanding of how Norges Bank makes 
their decisions, thereby giving this process more transparency.  
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